St. John's Law Review
Volume 89, Summer/Fall 2015, Numbers 2 & 3

Article 12

It is Political: Using the Models of Judicial Decision Making to
Explain the Ideological History of Title VII
Kate Webber

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 227 Side A

04/08/2016 13:04:55

3/24/16 12:16 PM

FINAL_WEBBER.DOCX

IT IS POLITICAL:
USING THE MODELS OF JUDICIAL
DECISION MAKING TO EXPLAIN THE
IDEOLOGICAL HISTORY OF TITLE VII
KATE WEBBER†
Scholars and observers often explain or interpret United
States Supreme Court decisions based on the ideology of the
sitting Justices.1 Many offer a similarly political account of the
Court’s decisions in actions brought under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 19642 (“Title VII”). Certain events in the history of
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1
E.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Roberts Court and Criminal Procedure at Age
Five, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 13, 15 (2010) (describing the United States Supreme
Court’s cases during the October 2009 term as “divided along ideological lines—with
Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito on one side and Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and
Sotomayor on the other”); Barbara A. Perry, The “Bush Twins?” Roberts, Alito, and
the Conservative Agenda, 92 JUDICATURE 302, 302 (2009) (“[Justices Alito and
Roberts’] initial Supreme Court opinions reflect a conservative agenda that reaches
back to the conservatism of Ronald Reagan.”); Adam Liptak, Three Justices Bound
by Beliefs, Not Just Gender, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2013, at A11 (describing the
decisions of Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan as the result of their liberal
ideology). Indeed, confirmation hearings for Supreme Court nominees reflect the
assumption that the appointee’s ideology will lead to certain votes. See, e.g., Michael
J. Songer, Note, Decline of Title VII Disparate Impact: The Role of the 1991 Civil
Rights Act and the Ideologies of Federal Judges, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 247, 247–48
(2005).
2
See, e.g., Robert Belton, Title VII at Forty: A Brief Look at the Birth, Death,
and Resurrection of the Disparate Impact Theory of Discrimination, 22 HOFSTRA
LAB. & EMP. L.J. 431, 463 (2005) (“As the membership of the Supreme Court began
to change, so too did the jurisprudence on Title VII.”); David A. Green, Why the
African-American Community Should Be Concerned About Supreme Court Nominee,
Samuel A. Alito: His Potential Impact on Title VII Cases, 33 S.U. L. REV. 425, 427,
436 (2006) (concluding that Justice Alito’s conservative views would lead to
restrictive decisions on Title VII issues); Cedric Merlin Powell, Harvesting New
Conceptions of Equality: Opportunity, Results, and Neutrality, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB.
L. REV. 255, 261–63 (2012) (describing the effect of conservative Justices on Title VII
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Title VII suggest ideological decision making by the Supreme
Court. Dozens of the Court’s Title VII opinions are split between
the conservative and liberal Justices.3
On three separate
occasions, including, most recently, the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay
Act of 2009,4 a more liberal Congress amended Title VII to
override the Supreme Court’s conservative interpretation of the
statute.5 Yet, subsequent to each of these amendments, the
conservative Justices continued to vote to restrict Title VII,
apparently following their political preference over Congressional
intent.6
The full history of Title VII, however, does not conclusively
establish that the Supreme Court decides cases according to
ideological viewpoint. Although numerous split decisions fall
along ideological lines,7 other cases, including a number of
unanimous decisions,8 reflect votes contrary to political viewpoint
and potentially indicate a different dynamic. The fifty years of
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jurisprudence); Songer, supra note 1, at 249 (“[T]he increasingly conservative
composition of the federal judiciary may explain a significant part of the decline in
successful Title VII challenges to facially-neutral employment practices.”). Songer
further explains, “Numerous commentators have posited that federal judges
appointed by Republican presidents are more skeptical of civil rights claims than
Democratic appointees.” Id. at 249 n.11 (citing Timothy B. Tomasi & Jess A. Velona,
Note, All the President’s Men? A Study of Ronald Reagan’s Appointments to the U.S.
Courts of Appeals, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 766, 776–77 (1987)).
3
E.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), superseded by
statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074; Connecticut v.
Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982); see also infra note 162 (listing cases).
4
Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29
and 42 U.S.C.).
5
See infra Part I.C. for a discussion of the three amendments.
6
See, e.g., JEB BARNES, OVERRULED?: LEGISLATIVE OVERRIDES, PLURALISM,
AND CONTEMPORARY COURT-CONGRESS RELATIONS 13–15 (2004) (noting that
following the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the Supreme Court still felt free to create its
own employer-friendly standard for punitive damages, contrary to the language of
the statute); Frank B. Cross & Blake J. Nelson, Strategic Institutional Effects on
Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1437, 1456–58 (2001) (describing
the Supreme Court’s response to the Civil Rights Act of 1991 amending Title VII and
finding that the conservative Court ignored Congress’s clear message that it
intended a broader interpretation of the statute).
7
See infra note 162.
8
See, e.g., Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP., 562 U.S. 170 (2011); Ash v. Tyson
Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454 (2006); see also Michael Selmi, The Supreme Court’s
Surprising and Strategic Response to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 46 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 281, 294–96 (2011) (describing a series of unanimous Supreme Court
decisions on Title VII).

37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 228 Side A

04/08/2016 13:04:55

3/24/16 12:16 PM

FINAL_WEBBER.DOCX

2015]

IT IS POLITICAL

843

Title VII jurisprudence, therefore, present the opportunity to
assess whether Justices’ votes on issues of employment
discrimination are determined by their respective ideologies.
To answer this question, this Article turns to the work of
political science scholars, specifically, the models of judicial
decision making developed by political theorists over the past two
decades.9 These models use sophisticated empirical techniques to
test whether the Justices of the Supreme Court vote according to
their ideologies and to explain the circumstances when Justices
vote contrary to their political viewpoints.10 Their work can be
divided into three predominant models—attitudinal, strategic
and integratedall of which agree that that ideology influences
Supreme Court decisions11 but offer different explanations for the
exceptions when the Court’s ideological pursuit is apparently
constrained.12 The political science models therefore offer the
potential to explain Title VII’s varied jurisprudence.
This potential, however, is not fully realized. The strategic
and integrated models fail to effectively explain a significant
portion of the Supreme Court’s Title VII decisions because these
models have generally failed to study the effect of statutory
overrides on the Court’s decision making. This Article therefore
draws on the few studies of overrides that are available, and
some of the more context-specific analyses, to draw a more
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9
E.g., RICHARD L. PACELLE, JR. ET AL., DECISION MAKING BY THE MODERN
SUPREME COURT 28–49 (2011). See generally LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE
CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002).
10
E.g., SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 9, at 312–26; Mario Bergara et al.,
Modeling Supreme Court Strategic Decision Making: The Congressional Constraint,
28 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 247, 260–67 (2003). See generally MICHAEL A. BAILEY & FORREST
MALTZMAN, THE CONSTRAINED COURT: LAW, POLITICS, AND THE DECISIONS
JUSTICES MAKE (2011); PACELLE ET AL., supra note 9.
11
PACELLE ET AL., supra note 9, at 53 (concluding that Court decisions reflect
“ideological predilections,” among other factors); SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 9, at
312–27 (describing the attitudinal model conclusion that ideology affects Supreme
Court decisions); Bergara et al., supra note 10, at 267 (explaining the strategic
model study conclusion that, in addition to strategic concerns, ideology influences
the Court).
12
See, e.g., BAILEY & MALTZMAN, supra note 10, at 15–16 (explaining that the
Supreme Court Justices are “policy-motivated,” but also constrained by the law, as
well as by the elected branches); EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 9, at 10–13 (noting
that Justices are constrained in their ideological decision making by the potential
response of the elected branches). But see SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 9, at 323–51
(finding empirical evidence of ideology in Supreme Court decision making but
finding no evidence that the preferences of the elected branches constrained it).
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nuanced model for Title VII and to account for the apparent
exceptions to ideological decision making.
Ultimately, this
Article asserts that the history of Title VII is not only political,
but also that the Supreme Court exhibits strong resistance to any
restraint on ideological voting in the area of employment
discrimination.
In Part I, this Article details the key features of Title VII’s
history, explaining the statute, the significant role the Supreme
Court has played in its interpretation, and the history of
congressional intervention to override Supreme Court decisions
on key issues. Part II reviews the existing evidence for and
against an ideological interpretation of Title VII’s case law. Part
III introduces the political science models of judicial decision
making and applies the models to Title VII. Part III also details
the models’ evidence of ideological voting by the Supreme Court
and matches this evidence with voting patterns in Title VII
cases. Part III further examines the challenge of the exceptions,
that is, the cases where the Justices did not vote according to
their ascribed ideology in interpreting Title VII. Part III also
explores whether the political science models can explain these
exceptions while still maintaining the basic premise of ideological
voting. Concluding in Part IV, this Article asserts that the
Supreme Court is particularly ideological in its decision making
on issues of minority rights and, as a result, many of the typical
constraints on the Court have not affected, and will not affect, its
ideological interpretation of Title VII.

Title VII’s
JusticesChief
Chief Justice
interpreted the

THE HISTORY OF TITLE VII

jurisprudence spans the terms of three Chief
Justice Burger, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and
Roberts13and twenty-three Justices have
statute over its history.14 During this time,
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13
See, e.g., Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006)
(Roberts Court); Lorance v. AT&T Techs., Inc. 490 U.S. 900 (1989) (Rehnquist
Court); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (Burger Court).
14
The earliest Title VII case that the Supreme Court decided was in 1971, in
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., at which time the Supreme Court was comprised
of Chief Justice Burger, Justices Stewart, Marshall, Black, Douglas, Harlan,
Brennan, White, and Blackmun. 400 U.S. 542 (1971); Members of the Supreme
Court, SUP. CT. U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members_text.aspx (last
visited Apr. 10, 2015). Since that time, the following other Justices have had the
opportunity to consider Title VII cases: Justices Powell, Stevens, O’Connor,
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Congress has weighed in with four major amendments, three of
which were passed in order to overturn Supreme Court decisions
concerning the statute’s meaning.15 The development of Title
VII’s case law and its history of amendments are the starting
points for analyzing the role that ideology may have played in the
Justices’ decisions. In conducting this review, it is generally
understood that decisions or amendments expanding Title VII’s
reach or easing the plaintiff-employee’s burden in litigation are
considered liberal, and decisions or amendments that favor
defendant-employers are considered conservative.16
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Rehnquist, Souter, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, Roberts, Alito,
Sotomayor, and Kagan. The Court most recently considered Title VII in EEOC v.
Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015).
15
The first amendment to Title VII came in the Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 1972. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103. Among other changes, this Act
extended Title VII to reach employers with as few as fifteen employees, as well as
state and local governments; it also lengthened the statute of limitations. Elinor P.
Schroeder, Title VII at 40: A Look Back, J. KAN. B. ASS’N, Nov.–Dec. 2004, at 18, 22–
23. Substantively, it defined Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination based on
religion to include “ ‘all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief’
and to add a requirement of reasonable accommodation.” Id. at 22 (quoting Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, sec. 2, § 701(j), 86 Stat.
103). The subsequent three amendments were passed for the specific purpose of
overturning Supreme Court decisions and are discussed in detail later in Part I. See
infra Part I.C. This Article describes the amendments as Congress’s response to the
Court’s interpretation of Title VII. Each amendment, however, was signed by the
President at the time and, thus, could also be viewed as the response of both elected
branches. See Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076
(1978) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012)); Civil Rights Act of 1991,
Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2,
16, 29, and 42 U.S.C.); Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123
Stat. 5 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 and 42 U.S.C.).
16
See, e.g., Christopher Smith, Polarized Circuits: Party Affiliation of
Appointing Presidents, Ideology, and Circuit Court Voting in Race and Gender Civil
Rights Cases, 22 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 157, 160, 165 (2011) (asserting that a vote
in favor of a race or gender civil rights claim is a vote in a liberal direction) (citing
CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY 19 (2006) (arguing that voting in favor of a discrimination
plaintiff is liberal)); William A. Wines, Title VII Interpretation and Enforcement in
the Reagan Years (1980-89): The Winding Road to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 77
MARQ. L. REV. 645, 685 (1994) (describing votes restricting Title VII as
conservative); see also Harold J. Spaeth et al., Online Code Book: Decision Direction,
SUP. CT. DATABASE, http://scdb.wustl.edu/documentation.php?var=decisionDirection
(last visited Apr. 10, 2015) (describing how this database of Supreme Court decisions
coded “pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant[s]” and “anti-employer” outcomes as
liberal and the reverse outcomes as conservative).
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The Title VII Statute

Title VII is just one provision of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,17 a broad statute passed in response to the civil rights
movement and designed to address inequality in many areas of
society.18 Title VII’s main antidiscrimination provision states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer—(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate,
or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.19

This prohibition bars intentional acts of disparate treatment
based on race, gender, and the other protected categories.20 Title
VII also forbids neutral employment policies that have a
demonstrable disparate impact on a protected class.21 Title VII
further prohibits harassment that is based on its covered
statutes even if no tangible job action has occurred.22 Finally, in
a separate statutory provision, Title VII bans retaliation against
those who report or oppose violations of the statute.23
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17
Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.).
18
Belton, supra note 2, at 432. See generally Schroeder, supra note 15, at 19–22
(describing the history of the Civil Rights Act).
19
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1)–(2) (West 2014).
20
E.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 985–86 (1988);
Ronald Turner, Thirty Years of Title VII’s Regulatory Regime: Rights, Theories, and
Realities, 46 ALA. L. REV. 375, 429 (1995).
21
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
22
E.g., Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64–65 (1986); EEOC
Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (2015).
23
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a).
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The Supreme Court’s Role in Interpreting Title VII

Since the statute’s passage, the Supreme Court has played a
fundamental role in developing the law of Title VII.24 The Court
has not only interpreted the meaning of Title VII’s language,25
but has also created substantive doctrines26 and important
evidentiary mechanisms for proving violations of the statute.27
In the course of this lengthy case history, the Supreme Court
has, in some cases, issued liberal decisions, which expanded or
defined Title VII in a manner favorable to employees. In other
cases, the Supreme Court issued conservative decisions, which
narrowed or defined the statute in a way that favors employers.
For example, in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,28 the Supreme
Court created the doctrine of disparate impact liability under
Title VII,29 which was later codified by Congress.30 Disparate
impact prohibits neutral acts with discriminatory effects.31 The
creation of this doctrine significantly expanded Title VII, which
had originally only prohibited intentional discrimination.32
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24
See, e.g., Theodore Y. Blumoff & Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Reagan Court and
Title VII: A Common-Law Outlook on a Statutory Task, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1, 4 (1990)
(describing the significant impact of the Court’s 1989 term on the reach of Title VII);
Emmanuel O. Iheukwumere & Philip C. Aka, Title VII, Affirmative Action, and the
March Toward Color-Blind Jurisprudence, 11 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 1, 22–
28 (2001) (describing the Supreme Court’s role in defining Title VII’s rules for
affirmative action in the workplace).
25
E.g., Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98–99 (2003) (interpreting the
Title VII subsection on the motivating factor standard of causation); Meritor Sav.
Bank, 477 U.S. at 64–65 (interpreting Title VII’s language barring discrimination
with respect to “terms, conditions or privileges of employment” to prohibit sexual
harassment (internal quotation marks omitted)).
26
E.g., Griggs, 401 U.S at 429–30 (creating the doctrine of disparate impact).
27
E.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–05 (1973)
(establishing a three-part test for proving discriminatory intent).
28
401 U.S. 424.
29
Id. at 429–30 (“The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII . . . was
to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have
operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over other
employees. Under the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and
even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to ‘freeze’ the
status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices.”).
30
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2012).
31
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429–30.
32
Belton, supra note 2, at 434 (“The disparate impact theory . . . combats not
intentional, obviously discriminatory policies, but a type of discrimination in which
facially neutral practices are employed to unnecessarily and disparately exclude
protected groups from employment opportunities. The Griggs disparate impact
theory, as later codified by Congress in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, put to rest the
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Later, the Supreme Court, in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green,33 developed a three-part test that allows plaintiffs to prove
discriminatory intent through circumstantial evidence, a proemployee construction that provides a crucial mechanism for
proving the invisible state of mind of the employer.34 In Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson,35 the Supreme Court held that sexual
harassment was a form of sex discrimination under Title VII,36
an interpretation that again substantively expanded the scope of
Title VII and the conduct that the statute prohibits.
The Court’s substantial role in the development of Title VII
is not limited to expanding the reach of the statute. In a number
of opinions, the Court issued conservative decisions that
significantly restricted the statute’s scope or made it more
difficult for employee-plaintiffs to prove violations.37
For
38
example, in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, the Court limited
Title VII’s reach by holding that pregnancy-based discrimination
was not sex discrimination under the statute.39 Recently, the
Supreme Court has issued decisions that made it difficult for
employees to prove harassment40 or retaliation41 claims under
Title VII.
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view that evidence supporting a finding of intentional discrimination is the only way
to establish a violation under civil rights statutes.” (footnotes omitted)).
33
411 U.S. 792.
34
Id. at 802–04; see also Green, supra note 2, at 428 (“In the early 1970s, the
Supreme Court, liberally interpreting Title VII, established a procedure redressing
invidious discrimination where there was no direct evidence and the plaintiff only
had circumstantial evidence.”).
35
477 U.S. 57 (1986).
36
Id. at 64–65; see also Ronald Turner, Making Title VII Law and Policy: The
Supreme Court’s Sexual Harassment Jurisprudence, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J.
575, 578 (2005) (“Title VII sexual harassment law ‘has been judge-made law’ and ‘is
a judicial rather than a legislative creation.’ ” (footnote omitted)).
37
Selmi, supra note 8, at 283 (“During the 1980s, the Supreme Court took a
deeply conservative turn on issues of civil rights, particularly with respect to
employment discrimination. The Court repeatedly reached adverse results for
plaintiffs, and even in cases in which the plaintiffs prevailed, the Court would often
impose significant limitations on the employment discrimination doctrine.”); see also
Nancy Gertner, Losers’ Rules, 122 YALE L.J. FORUM 109, 109 (2012) (“Changes in
substantive discrimination law since the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 were
tantamount to a virtual repeal. This was so not because of Congress; it was because
of judges.” (footnote omitted)).
38
429 U.S. 125 (1976), superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012).
39
Id. at 145–46.
40
Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2443 (2013) (limiting employer
liability for sexual harassment by narrowly defining the category of employees who
are considered supervisors).
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Legislative Overrides of Supreme Court Title VII Decisions

The Supreme Court’s role is one significant aspect of Title
VII’s history; the second is the elected branches’ role in reversing
the Court. A number of the Supreme Court’s conservative Title
VII decisions were so restrictive that the more liberal Congress
amended Title VII for the specific purpose of overturning the
Court.42 The earliest example of this type of congressional
override occurred in 1978 when Congress passed the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act43 (“PDA”) in response to the Supreme Court’s
1976 decision in Gilbert.44 As noted above, in the Gilbert case,
the Court held that the employer’s policy that discriminated
against pregnancy and related conditions did not discriminate on
the basis of sex.45 The PDA was drafted in direct response to this
decision46 and overturned Gilbert by amending Title VII to state
that “because of sex” includes “because of or on the basis of
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.”47
Similarly, in the most extensive amendment of Title VII, the
Civil Rights Act of 199148 (“CRA”), Congress overturned twelve
Supreme Court decisions that had restricted Title VII and other
federal antidiscrimination laws.49
For example, the CRA
superseded the Supreme Court’s holding in Wards Cove Packing
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41
Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2528 (2013) (stating
that plaintiffs bringing retaliation claims under Title VII are required to prove that
the retaliatory motive was a “but-for” cause of the employment action, not the more
lenient standard of motivating factor causation).
42
See e.g., Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the Separation of Powers:
Statutory Interpretation of Congressional Overrides, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 511,
516, 537–56 (2009).
43
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)).
44
429 U.S. at 145–46.
45
Id.
46
Widiss, supra note 42, at 552–53.
47
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (internal quotation marks omitted).
48
Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 2, 16, 29, and 42 U.S.C.); Maurice Wexler et al., The Law of Employment
Discrimination from 1985 to 2010, 25 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 349, 351 (2010)
(“Collectively, the substantive provisions of the 1991 CRA made it easier to assert
race discrimination claims; added the right to jury trials in Title VII cases;
established entitlement to limited compensatory and punitive damages for
intentional discrimination; limited the use of mixed-motive defenses; allowed timely
challenges to seniority systems and consent decrees; codified the Griggs v. Duke
Power disparate-impact model; addressed the extraterritorial reach of Title VII; and
permitted recovery of expert witness fees.” (footnotes omitted)).
49
Widiss, supra note 42, at 516.
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50
490 U.S. 642 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074.
51
Wexler et al., supra note 48, at 354 (citing Civil Rights Act of 1991, sec. 105,
§ 703, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074–75).
52
490 U.S. 228 (1989).
53
Id. at 265 (emphasis omitted).
54
Id. at 266.
55
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2012).
56
§ 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
57
Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29
and 42 U.S.C.).
58
550 U.S. 618 (2007).
59
Id. at 621, 628–29.
60
Id. at 644–45 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Co. v. Atonio,50 which had significantly expanded employers’
defenses to disparate impact claims.51 In one of the most
significant examples, the CRA overturned the Supreme Court’s
decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.52 According to Price
Waterhouse, employees with direct evidence of discrimination
could succeed under Title VII by showing that discriminatory
animus was a “substantial factor” in an employment decision,53
and employers could escape liability if they could affirmatively
prove the same decision would have occurred even in the absence
of the animus.54 The CRA superseded this holding and lowered
the causation standard to allow an employee to establish a Title
VII claim if the discriminatory animus was a mere “motivating
factor” in the decision.55 The CRA also restricted the Price
Waterhouse “same decision” affirmative defense, by removing the
employer’s ability to use it as a defense to liability and limiting
that defense to the question of damages.56
In the third and most recent example of congressional
override, the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 200957 (“Ledbetter
Act”), Congress overrode the Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.58 In Ledbetter, the
Court held that the Title VII statute of limitations for unequal
pay claims began running on the date the discriminatory pay is
established, even if the plaintiff was unaware of it.59
In
Ledbetter, the plaintiff had been receiving lower compensation
than similarly situated male employees, but only discovered it
and asserted a claim of discrimination long after the initial
compensation decisions that established the disparity were
made.60 The Court rejected the argument that each paycheck
could be a new violation that restarted the limitations period and
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found that the plaintiff’s claims were untimely filed.61 As Justice
Ginsburg explained in her dissent, the decision ignored the
characteristics of pay disparities, which are often hidden, and
significantly limited the plaintiff’s ability to bring discriminatory
compensation claims.62 Justice Ginsburg specifically called on
the legislature to act, and Congress did so with the Ledbetter
Act, which superseded the Supreme Court’s decision by
amending Title VII to specify that a discriminatory pay event
occurs each time a paycheck is issued.63 Thus, the Ledbetter Act
expands the time period for alleging claims of unequal pay and
broadens plaintiffs’ ability to challenge this type of
discrimination.64
This overview of Title VII’s history already suggests
ideological decision making by the Supreme Court. Over the past
fifty years, the Court has issued both liberal and conservative
decisions interpreting Title VII, which could reflect the Court’s
changing ideological composition. Moreover, on three separate
occasions
a
Democrat-controlled
Congress
overturned
conservative Supreme Court decisions, suggesting a Court
motivated by political belief more than concern for congressional
intent or rebuke.65 These suggestions, however, are insufficient
in themselves to establish ideological voting in Title VII cases,
and, as explained below, scholarly analysis and voting patterns
show conflicting views on this issue.

A.

Disagreement Among Scholars

It is common practice to explain or predict Supreme Court
rulings based on the ideology of the Justices.66 A number of
scholars of Title VII embrace this premise, believing that the
outcomes of Supreme Court cases are influenced by the Justices’

61

C M
Y K

04/08/2016 13:04:55

Id. at 637 (majority opinion).
Id. at 645, 660 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
63
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, sec. 3, § 706(e) 123
Stat. 5, 5–6 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (2012)).
64
See id.
65
See, e.g., Widiss, supra note 42.
66
E.g., Chemerinksy, supra note 1; Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court
Voting Behavior: 2006 Term, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 51, 57 (2008).
62
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respective viewpoints.67 For example, Emmanuel Iheukwumere
and Philip Aka analyzed a series of Supreme Court decisions on
affirmative action, including analysis under Title VII.68 They
concluded that the appointment of conservative Supreme Court
Justices led to the adoption of a “color-blind jurisprudence” that
is hostile to affirmative action and ultimately undermines racial
equality.69 Theodore Blumoff and Harold Lewis, Jr. similarly
concluded that the “Reagan Court” had certain policy “baselines”
that private parties should be able to form contracts as they wish
and that the “economy functions best with minimal government
interference.”70 They concluded that Title VII jurisprudence ran
“headlong into” these policy axioms, which limited the statute’s
reach.71
Conversely, some scholars offer explanations of Title VII’s
development based on factors other than the Justices’ ideologies.
For example, former United States District Court Judge Nancy
Gertner explains that, although ideology may have played a part
in Title VII jurisprudence, a powerful alternative theory,
“[a]symmetric decisionmaking,”72 can, in many ways, better
explain the development of this area of law.73 In another
example, Anne McGinely explains at least part of the Supreme
Court’s Title VII decision in Ricci v. DeStefano,74 based on the
studies of “cognitive illiberalism,” which show “people of different
67

E.g., Green, supra note 2, at 427, 435.
Iheukwumere & Aka, supra note 24, at 29–43.
69
Id. at 54 (“As applied by the federal judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court
under Rehnquist, color-blind jurisprudence is merely a subterfuge employed by the
Court to cover the fact that it is deliberately ignoring its own precedents on
affirmative action prior to the ascendancy of Rehnquist to the helm of the Court.”).
70
Blumoff & Lewis, supra note 24, at 5.
71
Id. at 5; see also Powell, supra note 2, at 257–58, 262 (“[I]t now seems likely
that the fate of disparate impact claims under Title VII will replicate the fate of
affirmative action under the Court’s conservative bloc jurisprudence.” (quoting
Girardeau A. Spann, Disparate Impact, 98 GEO. L.J. 1133, 1148 (2010)); Green,
supra note 2, at 440 (“With the appointment of Chief Justice Roberts to replace Chief
Justice Rehnquist and the appointment of Justice Alito to replace Justice O’Connor,
to go along with Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy, there is a solid conservative
block on the Supreme Court that will establish jurisprudence in Title VII cases.”
(footnote omitted)).
72
Gertner, supra note 37, at 110. Asymmetric decision making results from
repeat players, such as employers, settling strong cases and litigating weak cases.
The result over time is judicial interpretations that favor the repeat players’
interests. Id. at 110, 113–14.
73
Id. at 110.
74
557 U.S. 557 (2009).
68
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cultural viewpoints and identities interpret[] the facts
differently.”75 William Corbett interprets the development of
Title VII jurisprudence as a process of “tortification,” that is, the
incorporation of tort principles to interpret the statute’s
meaning.76 Other analyses interpret the development of Title VII
as a progression of the Justices’ choices on how to conduct
statutory interpretation, with changes reflecting different
emphasis or interpretation on textual language, statutory
purpose, or legislative intent.77
Thus, there is no firm consensus that Title VII case law is
the result of the Supreme Court’s ideology. A number of different
potential explanations are available—some political, some not.
This conflict among theorists is mirrored by a mixed body of law.
B.

Ideological and Nonideological Cases

A number of Supreme Court decisions support an ideologybased interpretation of Title VII’s history. In these cases, the
Court’s votes are split according to the ascribed political views of
the Justices.78 For example, in the most recent term, the Court
issued two major Title VII decisions with a five-to-four ideological
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75
Ann C. McGinley, Cognitive Illiberalism, Summary Judgment, and Title VII:
An Examination of Ricci v. Destefano, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 865, 869 (2012–13).
McGinley concludes that this “cultural cognition” influenced the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the Ricci facts and, therefore, its grant of summary judgment to
defendant was improper. Id. at 868–70 (attributing “the poor showing of
employment discrimination plaintiffs to fundamental American beliefs concerning
meritocracy and discrimination” to “psychological research [that] demonstrates that
most people in most situations are ‘unwilling to make robust attributions of
discrimination’ ” (quoting Katie R. Eyer, That’s Not Discrimination: American Beliefs
and the Limits of Anti-Discrimination Law, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1275, 1278 (2012)).
76
William R. Corbett, Unmasking a Pretext for Res Ipsa Loquitur: A Proposal To
Let Employment Discrimination Speak for Itself, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 447, 456–67
(2013).
77
Sandra F. Sperino, Revitalizing State Employment Discrimination Law, 20
GEO. MASON L. REV. 545, 554 (2013) (“While many of [the Title VII] frameworks
grow out of the statutory language of the federal statutes, they also derive from
those statutes’ unique histories, as well as the choices the Supreme Court has made
regarding how to piece together the purpose of the statutes and their legislative and
textual history.” (citing Ann C. McGinley, !Viva La Evolucion!: Recognizing
Unconscious Motive in Title VII, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 415, 446 n.194, 479
(2000))).
78
For purposes of this Section, this Article ascribes a political preference to the
Justices based on the perception indicated by the press and by scholars. Cf. SEGAL &
SPAETH, supra note 9, at 204, 321–22 (using statements in newspaper editorials at
the time of a Justice’s nomination to measure that Justice’s ideology).
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divide. In University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v.
Nassar,79 the Court restricted Title VII’s protections against
retaliation by holding that plaintiffs must establish that the
retaliatory motive was the “but-for” cause of the employment
action, rather than meet the more lenient “motivating-factor”
standard.80 In this conservative decision,81 Justice Kennedy, the
swing vote,82 wrote the opinion for the majority, joined by the
perceived conservatives, Justices Scalia, Roberts, Alito, and
Thomas.83
The four dissenting Justices, Ginsburg, Breyer,
Sotomayor, and Kagan, are all members of the liberal bloc.84 The
Justices’ votes in Vance v. Ball State University85 show an
identical ideological divide. In Vance, the Supreme Court again
restricted Title VII’s scope by broadening one of the employers’
defenses to liability for harassment.86 Justice Alito, joined by
Justices Scalia, Roberts, and Kennedy, wrote the majority
opinion, and Justice Thomas filed a concurrence.87 The four
liberal Justices again dissented.88

79

133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013).
Id. at 2534.
81
The description of a case outcome as conservative or liberal is based on the
case direction designation in Harold Spaeth’s U.S. Supreme Court Database. See
Spaeth et al., supra note 16; see also Lee Epstein & William M. Landes, Was There
Ever Such a Thing as Judicial Self-Restraint?, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 557, 565 (2012)
(using this database to determine the ideological direction of the Court’s decisions).
82
See Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1995 Term, 24
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 31–32 (1996) (identifying Justice Kennedy as a swing vote
between liberal and conservative blocks); Editorial, Injustice 5, Justice 4, N.Y.
TIMES, May 31, 2007, at A18, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/31/
opinion/31thu1.html?_r=0 (describing Justice Kennedy as a swing vote).
83
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2522; see Chemerinsky, supra note 1 (identifying the
conservative bloc of Justices Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito); Perry, supra note 1
(describing Justices Roberts and Alito as conservative); Wilkins et al., supra note 66
(identifying conservative voting patterns of Justices Scalia, Thomas, Roberts, and
Alito).
84
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2522; see Chemerinsky, supra note 1 (identifying
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer as part of the liberal bloc); Charles D. Kelso & R.
Randall Kelso, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of Justice Kennedy on Speech, 49
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 693, 694 (2012) (identifying the current liberal bloc as Justices
Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan); Liptak, supra note 1 (describing Justices
Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan as liberal).
85
133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013).
86
Id. at 2446–47.
87
Id. at 2438, 2454.
88
Id. at 2454.
80
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The Nassar and Vance cases are just two of many examples
where the Supreme Court’s decisions either limited or broadened
the reach of Title VII, depending on whether the conservative or
liberal Justices were able to garner a majority. For example, in
Connecticut v. Teal,89 the Court issued an employee-friendly
decision with a split in Justices according to their ascribed
political views.90 In this case, the employer claimed that a
screening test for promotion, which disproportionately excluded
blacks, could be excused because the ultimate percentage of
blacks promoted reflected an appropriate racial balance.91
Justice Brennan, a member of the liberal bloc,92 crafted the
majority opinion rejecting this “bottom-line defense” to Title VII
disparate impact liability,93 and fellow liberals, Justices
Blackmun, Stevens, and Marshall,94 joined.95 Justice White, a
moderate Republican appointee,96 joined the majority.97 Justice
Powell98 filed a dissenting opinion,99 joined by conservatives
Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist,100 along with swing vote
Justice O’Connor.101
89

457 U.S. 440 (1982).
Id.
91
Id. at 444, 452.
92
Lino A. Graglia, The Legacy of Justice Brennan: Constitutionalization of the
Left-Liberal Political Agenda, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 183, 189 (1999) (identifying Justice
Brennan as liberal).
93
Teal, 457 U.S. at 442, 452.
94
Jeff Bleich & Kelly Klaus, The Liberal Legacy: The Imprint of the Warren Era
Remains and Continues To Influence the Court, OR. ST. B. BULL., Aug.–Sept. 1999,
at 13 (“Justice Blackmun and the two [J]ustices with whom he was most frequently
aligned, William J. Brennan, Jr. and Thurgood Marshall, were the last holdouts of
the ‘liberal’ wing.”); James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Liberal Justices’ Reliance
on Legislative History: Principle, Strategy, and the Scalia Effect, 29 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 117, 120 (2008) (describing Justices Stevens, Blackmun, Brennan,
and Marshall as liberal Justices).
95
Teal, 457 U.S. at 442.
96
Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing at the Crossroads: The Roberts Court in
Historical Perspective, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 875, 935 n.238 (2008) (describing
Justice White as sometimes moderate and sometimes conservative); Robert H.
Smith, Uncoupling the “Centrist Bloc”—An Empirical Analysis of the Thesis of a
Dominant, Moderate Bloc on the United States Supreme Court, 62 TENN. L. REV. 1, 3
(1994) (describing Justice White as a “centrist” and noting that many commentators
identified him as a moderate).
97
457 U.S. at 442.
98
Stearns, supra note 96, at 896–97 (describing Justice Powell as a moderate
conservative).
99
Teal, 457 U.S. at 456.
100
Id. Michael C. Dorf, Does Federal Executive Branch Experience Explain Why
Some Republican Supreme Court Justices “Evolve” and Others Don’t?, 1 HARV. L. &
90
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Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonia,102 is another example of
ideological voting, wherein the Supreme Court issued a
conservative decision restricting the reach of Title VII.103 Wards
Cove made it easier for employers to defend against a disparate
impact suit under Title VII.104 In that case, the three Republican
appointed swing votes, Justices White, Kennedy, and O’Connor,
joined conservatives Justices Rehnquist and Scalia for the
majority.105 The liberal group of Justices, Stevens, Brennan,
Marshall, and Blackmun, dissented.106
Although many Supreme Court decisions interpreting Title
VII fit the narrative of ideological voting, a significant number do
not. For example, since 1971, the Supreme Court issued at least
thirty-five unanimous decisions in Title VII cases107 on such

04/08/2016 13:04:55
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POL’Y REV. 457, 462 (2007) (describing conventional wisdom, confirmed by analysis
of voting patterns, that Justice Burger was a conservative and Justice Rehnquist
even more so); Lori A. Ringhand, Judicial Activism: An Empirical Examination of
Voting Behavior on the Rehnquist Natural Court, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 43, 48 (2007)
(describing Rehnquist’s conservative voting patterns).
101
457 U.S. at 456; see Smith, supra note 96 (noting the common description of
Justice O’Connor as a centrist); Eric J. Segall, Justice O’Connor and the Rule of Law,
17 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 107, 134 (2006) (“For most of her time on the bench,
Justice O’Connor served as the crucial swing vote.”).
102
490 U.S. 642 (1989).
103
Id.
104
Id. at 657–59.
105
Id. at 644.
106
Id.
107
The following cases were unanimous as to reasoning and result. Ash v. Tyson
Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454 (2006); Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003);
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002); Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v.
Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001); Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S.
843 (2001); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998); Walters v.
Metro. Educ. Enters., Inc., 519 U.S. 202 (1997); Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S.
337 (1997); Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820 (1990); Bazemore v.
Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986); W.R. Grace and Co. v. Local Union 759, Int’l Union of
United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers of Am., 461 U.S. 757 (1983);
Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982); N.W. Airlines, Inc. v.
Transp. Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77 (1981); Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412
(1978); E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys. Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977); Chandler
v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840 (1976); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36
(1974); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Love v. Pullman Co.,
404 U.S. 522 (1972); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The following
cases were unanimous as to result. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170
(2011); Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 555 U.S. 271
(2009); Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006); Edelman v.
Lynchburg Coll., 535 U.S. 106 (2002); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17
(1993); UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991); Watson v. Ft. Worth
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issues as same-sex harassment,108 the standard for retaliation
claims,109 and the scope of disparate impact.110 This unanimity
among the liberal, moderate, and conservative camps111
undermines the claim that political preference guides Title VII
votes.112 Indeed, in some of these cases, the Justices voted
contrary to the expectations of their ascribed political views. For
example, in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,113 conservative
Justice Rehnquist penned the opinion that expanded Title VII to
include sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination.114 In
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust,115 Justices Rehnquist and
Scalia agreed with the unanimous Court that disparate impact
analysis could be extended to apply to subjective or discretionary
promotion systems, as well as to objective tests.116 In a recent
example, Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP,117 Justice
Scalia wrote the opinion of the Court which expanded Title VII to
prohibit employers from retaliating against third parties in order
to punish employees who complain of discrimination.118
Thus, an overview of Title VII—the history of amendment,
the varied Supreme Court decisions, and the diverse scholarly
analysis—does not conclusively establish an ideologically driven

04/08/2016 13:04:55
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Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986);
Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984); U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v.
Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983); Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345 (1983);
Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385 (1982); Furnco Const. Corp. v.
Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978); Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977); Franks
v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445
(1976); Int’l Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, Local 790 v. Robbins & Myers,
Inc., 429 U.S. 229 (1976); Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971); see
also Selmi, supra note 8, at 293–94 (identifying eighteen unanimous Supreme Court
employment discrimination decisions from 1993 to 2010 and suggesting that the
unanimity reflected the Court’s strategic response to the Civil Rights Act of 1991).
108
Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79.
109
White, 548 U.S. at 60.
110
Watson, 487 U.S. at 987.
111
For example, in the unanimous decision in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa,
Justice Ginsburg joined Justice Thomas’s opinion for the Court. 539 U.S. 90.
112
Selmi, supra note 8, at 298 (noting unanimous cases indicated a shift in the
Supreme Court toward a more pro-plaintiff position).
113
477 U.S. 57 (1986).
114
Id. at 73.
115
487 U.S. 977 (1988).
116
Id. at 991.
117
562 U.S. 170 (2011).
118
Id. Justices Roberts, Kennedy, Sotomayor, Thomas, and Alito all joined in
the majority, with Justice Kagan recusing herself and Justice Ginsburg filing a
concurrence joined by Justice Breyer. Id. at 178–79.
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jurisprudence. Those adopting the political interpretation can
identify supporting examples, but exceptions and theories
challenge this view. An interdisciplinary approach can aid in
this effort to determine whether the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence on Title VII is ideological.
Political science
scholarship on judicial decision making offers particularly
relevant empirical evidence and theories to enhance this
incomplete picture.
III. USING POLITICAL SCIENCE MODELS TO ANALYZE
TITLE VII JURISPRUDENCE

C M
Y K
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119
Kate Webber, Correcting the Supreme Court—Will It Listen? Using the
Models of Judicial Decision-Making To Predict the Future of the ADA Amendments
Act, 23 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L. J. 305, 305 (2014) (citing PACELLE ET AL., supra note 9,
at 28–49).
120
E.g., PACELLE ET AL., supra note 9, at 44, 71; SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 9,
at 312–26.
121
Cf. Webber, supra note 119, at 332–52 (using the models of judicial decision
making to predict how the Supreme Court will respond to the Americans with
Disabilities Act Amendments Act (“ADAAA”)).
122
E.g., BAILEY & MALTZMAN, supra note 10, at 1 (“Much of the [political
science] discipline has long embraced the notion that judicial outcomes primarily
reflect judicial policy preferences . . . .”); EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 9, at 23 (“It
is generally conceded, at least among social scientists, that members of the Court
are by and large policy seekers.”).
123
E.g., PACELLE ET AL., supra note 9, at 44, 71; SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 9,
at 312–26.
124
See supra Part II.A.
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Political science scholars have long studied the Supreme
Court’s decision making,119 including empirically measuring
whether the decisions are based on ideology, the law, or other
factors.120 Their works study Supreme Court decisions in broader
areas of law but can provide a useful basis for assessing whether
Title VII jurisprudence is the result of an ideological Court.121
The consensus among the predominant political science studies is
that political preference does indeed drive Supreme Court
decisions.122
Their conclusion is based on empirical
measurements that accurately capture the political ideology of
the Court and find statistically valid means of measuring its
impact.123 Further, a subset of this scholarship also offers
theoretical and empirical explanations for the exceptions when
Justices appear to vote contrary to their political viewpoints,124
potentially explaining the varied history of Title VII. Ultimately,
applying the models to Title VII reveals that the Supreme
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Court’s interpretation of this statute is particularly ideological.
The political science models that posit constraints on ideological
voting do not match well with the history of Title VII. At best, in
Title VII, the only apparently effective exception to
ideology-based voting is when the Court is faced with direct
statutory language or long-standing precedent, a narrower
category of constraint than in other areas of law.
A.

Summary of the Models

C M
Y K
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125
See Webber, supra note 119, at 309 (“Although some models have included an
analysis of judicial decision-making in lower federal courts, the models have
generally focused on explaining and predicting Supreme Court decisions.” (footnote
omitted)).
126
LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES 69 (2013); PACELLE
ET AL., supra note 9, at 34–36; SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 9, at 86.
127
EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 9, at 10.
128
BAILEY & MALTZMAN, supra note 10, at 97–101 (describing the strategic
model); PACELLE ET AL., supra note 9, at 39–45 (explaining the strategic model).
129
BAILEY & MALTZMAN, supra note 10, at 98–101.
130
See generally id. at 101–19; PACELLE ET AL., supra note 9, at 51–52.
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Within political science, three theories, or models, of judicial
decision making are particularly influential and supported by
robust empirical and theoretical analysis. First, the attitudinal
model of judicial decision making posits that Supreme Court
Justices125 decide cases based on their individual political
preferences and are not constrained in that ideological pursuit by
congressional or presidential intent, nor even by the dictates of
the law.126 Second, the strategic model of judicial decision
making asserts that Justices decide cases based on their
ideologies, but under certain circumstances, are constrained by
their coequal branches of government.127 Specifically, according
to this model, Justices will pursue their political preference so
long as it will not trigger a congressional response to override
their decision.128 If Justices’ true preferences are outside the
realm of political acceptability, such that an override or other
congressional response is likely, Justices will modify their
positions to fall within the realm of positions acceptable to the
elected branches.129 Finally, recent works have espoused a third,
integrated model that claims Justices decide cases based largely
on ideology but are tempered in this political motive by strategic
influences and by the constraining force of the law itself.130
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The various models of judicial decision making base their
claims on empirical studies that test for a statistical correlation
between the Justices’ political views and their votes in particular
cases.131 This first model requires a valid measurement of the
Justices’ individual ideologies.132 Political science scholars have
developed an extensive body of work on this issue alone and offer
empirical, standardized methods of identifying Justices’
respective political viewpoints.133 A complete explanation of the
various methods used by political scientists to estimate Justices’
ideologies is beyond the scope of this Article. As an extremely
simplified description, however, the predominant methods for
determining judicial ideology assess the Justices’ voting patterns
and use other data and statistical methods to control for
potential motivations other than political preference.134 For the
purposes of this Article, it is enough to understand that Justices’
political preferences can be quantified through valid, testable
methods.135

131

E.g., SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 9, at 323; Bergara et al., supra note 10, at

260.
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132
See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 9, at 320–24 (giving an example of
measuring the Justices’ ideologies); Bergara et al., supra note 10, at 260–61.
133
PACELLE ET AL., supra note 9, at 215–16; see, e.g., Lee Epstein et al., The
Judicial Common Space, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 303, 306–08 (2007); Lee Epstein &
Carol Mershon, Measuring Political Preferences, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 261, 263–65
(1996); Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via
Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999, 10 POL.
ANALYSIS 134, 136–40 (2002).
134
E.g., BAILEY & MALTZMAN, supra note 10, at 27–43; PACELLE ET AL., supra
note 9, at 215–16; Bergara et al., supra note 10, at 251–56; Lee Epstein et al., The
Supreme Court as a Strategic National Policymaker, 50 EMORY L.J. 583, 601–03
(2001); Jeffrey A. Segal, Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of
Congress and Courts, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 28, 35–36 (1997); see also SEGAL &
SPAETH, supra note 9, 204, 320–22 (“To determine perceptions of nominees’
qualifications and judicial philosophy, we use a content analysis from statements in
newspaper editorials from the time of the nomination until the Senate voted. The
analysis used four of the nation’s leading papers, two with a liberal stance, the New
York Times and the Washington Post, and two with a more conservative outlook, the
Chicago Tribune and the Los Angeles Times. . . . Ideology ranges from 0 (extremely
conservative) to 1 (extremely liberal).” (footnote omitted)).
135
Indeed, the various assessments lead to sensible results. For example,
Justices Scalia and Rehnquist score the most conservative, Justice O’Connor as a
moderate, and Justices such as Marshall and Brennan receive liberal scores. E.g.,
SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 9, at 321–22 (“We believe that the scores accurately
measure the perceptions of the [J]ustices’ values at the time of their nomination.
While not everyone would agree that every score precisely measures the perceived
ideology of each nominee, Fortas, Marshall, and Brennan are expectedly the most
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With the Justices’ political preferences established, the
various political science models use statistical techniques to
measure whether a meaningful correlation exists between the
Justices’ ideology and case votes.136 The studies also test whether
other factors, such as legal precedent or concern for congressional
override, influence votes.137 Political science scholars have used
these techniques in numerous studies conducted over the last
decade, creating a substantial body of empirical work on the role
of ideology in Supreme Court decisions.138 Thus, the political
science models of judicial decision making offer an
interdisciplinary, empirical basis for assessing whether the
Supreme Court’s Title VII’s jurisprudence is the result of the
Justices’ ideologies.
B.

Title VII and the Attitudinal Model

C M
Y K

04/08/2016 13:04:55

liberal, while Scalia and Rehnquist are the most conservative. . . . O’Connor comes
out as a moderate, given her previous support for women’s rights and abortion.”).
136
Again, the statistical techniques behind these studies are beyond the scope of
this Article but are detailed at length in the predominant studies cited. See, e.g.,
PACELLE ET AL., supra note 9, at 54–60; SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 9, at 312–26;
Bergara et al., supra note 10, at 251–60.
137
E.g., BAILEY & MALTZMAN, supra note 10, at 68–72, 103–19.
138
See generally PACELLE ET AL., supra note 9, at 28–50 (describing the
development of and the body of work on the models of judicial decision making).
139
PACELLE ET AL., supra note 9, at 34–36; SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 9, at
86.
140
Margaret H. Lemos, The Consequences of Congress’s Choice of Delegate:
Judicial and Agency Interpretations of Title VII, 63 VAND. L. REV. 363, 388 (2010).
141
Id. at 407–08.
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According to the attitudinal model, Supreme Court Justices
decide cases based on their political viewpoints.139 Applied to
Title VII, the attitudinal model explains the case law according
to the political makeup of the Court, with defendant-employer
friendly decisions as the result of a coalition of conservative
Justices and pro-plaintiff employee decisions as the result of a
liberal Justices wielding the necessary five votes. In fact, a few
legal scholars have found evidence connecting Title VII case
outcomes to the ideology of the deciding Justices. For example,
in 2010, Margaret Lemos published an empirical study of every
case decided by the Supreme Court “that involved a question of
interpretation or application of Title VII.”140 She identified a
“strong correlation” between the Justices’ votes on Title VII
issues and their presumed political preferences141 based on her
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finding that “Justices who are generally viewed as ‘liberal’ have
cast a high proportion of ‘liberal’ votes in the Title VII context,
while the opposite is true for Justices typically deemed
‘conservative.’ ”142
For example, Lemos found that Justice
Ginsburg’s and Justice Breyer’s votes on Title VII cases were
liberal eighty-four percent and eighty-eight percent of the time
while Justices Scalia and Thomas were liberal only forty-three
percent and fifty-two percent of the time.143
In 1994, William Wines examined every Supreme Court Title
VII decision during the Reagan era, 1980 to 1988.144 Wines found
a distinct pattern of decisions, with Justices identified as liberal
consistently voting to expand the reach of Title VII, Justices
identified as conservative consistently voting to restrict the
statute’s reach, and Justices identified as moderate providing the
swing vote in the Court split.145 For example, for the period of
1980 to 1985, Wines identified six expansive Supreme Court
decisions on Title VII and five restrictive decisions.146 He then
tallied the votes and found that Justices Rehnquist, Powell,
Burger, and O’Connor had the most conservative record of votes
and Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and Blackmun had the
most liberal.147
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142
Id. Lemos also found this correlation between the appointing President and
the Justices’ Title VII vote. Id. at 408 (“Justices appointed by Democratic presidents
tend to render significantly more liberal decisions than Justices appointed by
Republican presidents.”). However, she acknowledged the significant exceptions to
this trend and cautioned that “[s]ome of the most liberal Justices to cast votes
during the Title VII era were appointed by Republican Presidents” and “Reagan’s
three appointees—O’Connor (1982), Scalia (1984), and Kennedy (1988)—all proved
to be farther to the left on Title VII issues than the Justices they replaced.” Id.
143
Id. at 409.
144
Wines, supra note 16, at 662.
145
Id. at 687, 690.
146
Id. at 685–87.
147
Id. For the period of 1985 to 1989, Wines identified twenty Title VII
decisions—six expanding the statute, seven restricting it, and seven maintaining the
status quo. Id. at 688. Again, Wines identified patterns of voting that match the
ascribed political views of the Justices. Id. Justices Rehnquist and Scalia
consistently voted to restrict Title VII, while Justices Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun,
and Stevens consistently voted to expand Title VII. Id. “Justices O’Connor, White
and Powell provided the swing votes that influenced results in either direction
depending on the issues at hand.” Id. at 688–89. Wines found that in the five Title
VII cases at issue from the time Justice Kennedy joined the Court in February 1988
until the end of the period studied, April 1990, Justice Kennedy consistently voted
with the conservatives, Justices Rehnquist and Scalia. Id. at 690. Justice Kennedy
would later be viewed as a swing vote, see Wilkins et al., supra note 82, at 32, but
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Although these studies identify ideological voting trends, the
attitudinal explanation of Title VII’s jurisprudence appears
incomplete. For example, in addition to the ideologically split
decisions, Wines also identified a number of unanimous
decisions,148 a finding which undermines any claim of purely
ideological decision making by the Justices. In fact, Wines’s
ultimate conclusions undermine the association between ideology
and Supreme Court votes.149 Similarly, although Lemos finds the
expected association of liberal votes with liberal Justices, her
results also continue to document the fact that ideology-based
voting is not one hundred percent; indeed, according to her study,
even Justice Thomas issues liberal votes on Title VII about half
of the time.150
On the surface level, these exceptions undermine the claim
that the Supreme Court decides cases based on ideology. The
exceptions seem to pose the most significant challenge to the
attitudinal model given its premise that “[J]ustices care only
about policy”151 and this “single variable” explains their
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according to Wines, in this abbreviated period, he was conservative. See Wines,
supra note 16, at 690.
148
Wines, supra note 16, at 685 (noting that three of the six cases from 1980 to
1985 that expanded Title VII were unanimous); id. at 690 (identifying two
unanimous cases in the 1986 to 1989 period that expanded Title VII).
149
Ultimately, although acknowledging the small sample size, Wines also found
that “no statistically significant relationship, using a chi-square test, between voting
pattern and Presidential appointment.” Id. at 716. He further concluded:
[C]areful ideological screening of federal judicial candidates did not assure
President Reagan the “correct” votes on Title VII cases in the short run as
measured by conservative ideology . . . as late as 1989, Supreme Court
decisions did not reflect President Reagan’s agenda for Title VII [in part]
because, despite excellent conservative credentials, Justice O’Connor had
voted with the liberal wing on employment discrimination issues.
Id. at 717.
150
Lemos, supra note 140, at 409.
151
BAILEY & MALTZMAN, supra note 10, at 5 (citing SEGAL & SPAETH, supra
note 9, at 111); see also PACELLE ET AL., supra note 9, at 35–36 (explaining the
attitudinal model and its belief that “[J]ustices are totally unencumbered in deciding
cases” according to their values and attitudes and are “single-minded political
actors”); Epstein et al., supra note 134, at 588 (“Based on the attitudinal model, no
factors other than ideology come into play [in Supreme Court decisions].”). The
critiques of the attitudinal model often highlight the problem of its failure to
accommodate exceptions to attitudinal voting. PACELLE ET AL., supra note 9, at
37–39.
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individual decisions.152 In fact, critics challenge the attitudinal
model as “too simplistic and too exclusive of other possible
contributing factors” to the Supreme Court’s decision making.153
The proponents of the attitudinal model explain, however,
that the purpose of the model is to establish a meaningful
measure of the Court overall, as opposed to explaining every
individual case.154 Regardless of individual exceptions, if the
attitudinal model establishes a strong correlation between
ideology and judicial votes overall, this informs important
questions,155 such as whether the Democrats made the right
decision in limiting the ability to filibuster judicial
appointments.156 Thus, the proponents of the attitudinal model
offer it as the best—the most empirically validated—explanation
of the Supreme Court’s decisions among all the theories on what
drives the Court’s behavior.157
Moreover, some of the exceptions to ideology-based voting
can be explained by the importance of the issue to the Justices, or
salience.158 Recent explorations of attitudinal theory have found
that ideology has a stronger influence on Supreme Court votes in
salient cases than in cases that are less salient to the Court.159
Salience becomes a useful explanatory factor, particularly in
light of the evidence that the issue of minority rights is
particularly salient to the Supreme Court.160 In fact, a number of
Supreme Court Title VII decisions where one or more Justices
152
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PACELLE ET AL., supra note 9, at 36.
Id. at 37.
154
See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 9, at 45–46 (explaining that the criteria for
evaluating a model is whether it provides a better explanation of reality than
alternatives); Isaac Unah & Ange-Marie Hancock, U.S. Supreme Court Decision
Making, Case Salience, and the Attitudinal Model, 28 LAW & POL’Y 295, 296 (2006)
(“What is intriguing about the [attitudinal] model is its deceptively simple but
powerful logic: [J]ustices come to the Supreme Court with their ideological
preferences fully formed and, in light of contextual case facts these preferences cast
overwhelming influence on their decision making. Thus the attitudinal model is a
complete and adequate model of Supreme Court behavior, though not a complete
explanation for [J]ustices’ votes.” (citation omitted)).
155
See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 9, at 45–46.
156
S. Res. 15 & 16, 113th Cong. (2013) (enacted).
157
SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 9, at 351.
158
PACELLE ET AL., supra note 9, at 202.
159
E.g., id.; Unah & Hancock, supra note 154, at 296, 307.
160
BARNES, supra note 6, at 171 (describing empirical evidence that the
Supreme Court is particularly resistant to congressional influence in votes on
minority rights, noting the importance of the issue to the Court given its “special
role in scrutinizing statutes that affect ‘suspect’ classes”).
153
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voted contrary to ideology involved less salient procedural
questions that did not implicate the scope of protections for
minority employees.161 Thus, a Title VII decision where Justices
voted contrary to political preference may simply reflect a case of
less importance, rather than an exception that challenges the
attitudinal model. Overall, the attitudinal model provides a
compelling explanation for a significant number of Title VII
cases162 and supports the thesis that the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence in this area is driven by ideology.
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161
Michael Selmi found this trend in an analysis of the Court’s Title VII
decisions after the Civil Rights Act of 1991. See Selmi, supra note 8, at 291–92.
Selmi drew a different conclusion about the significance of this trend, which is
addressed in Part III.C. Less salient Title VII cases from other time periods also
reflect this trend. See, e.g., Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345 (1983)
(concerning the effect of class action on Title VII statute of limitations and resulting
in a unanimous liberal outcome in case); E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v.
Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977) (concerning proper class representatives in Title VII
class action and resulting in a unanimous conservative decision); Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (concerning the effect of union arbitration
proceeding on the right to bring claims under Title VII and resulting in a unanimous
liberal decision); Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522 (1972) (concerning
administrative filing requirements and resulting in a unanimous liberal decision
among conservative, moderate and liberal Justices).
162
See generally Vance v. Ball State Univ., 113 S. Ct. 2434 (2013) (conservative
decision with Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Roberts, and Alito for the majority, Justice
Thomas concurring, and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan
dissenting); Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007)
(conservative decision with Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Roberts, and Alito in
the majority and Justices Steven, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer in the dissent); St.
Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993) (conservative decision with Justices
Rehnquist, O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas for the majority and Justices
White, Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter dissenting); Wards Cove Packing, Co. v.
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074 (conservative decision with Justices White, Rehnquist,
O’Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy for the majority and Justices Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens dissenting); Local 28 Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478
U.S. 421 (1986) (liberal decision with Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and
Stevens for the majority, Justice Powell concurring, and Justices White, Burger,
Rehnquist, and O’Connor dissenting); Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982)
(liberal decision with Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens for
the majority and Justices Burger, Powell, Rehnquist, and O’Connor dissenting);
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (liberal decision with Justices
Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall, and Blackmun for the majority and Burger and
Rehnquist dissenting). As noted previously, for this analysis, the case direction of
liberal or conservative is taken from Harold Spaeth’s United States Supreme Court
Database. Spaeth et al., supra note 16; see Epstein & Landes, supra note 81, at 565
(adopting U.S. Supreme Court Database assessments of liberal and conservative
decisions). For assessments of the political ideologies of the Justices, see supra notes
in Part II.B. There are other Supreme Court Title VII decisions generally reflecting
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Title VII and the Strategic Model

Proponents of the strategic model challenge the attitudinal
model’s premise that ideology is the only reliably predictive
influence on the Supreme Court.163 According to the strategic
model, although ideology has a strong influence on the Court’s
decisions, the Supreme Court is constrained in its ideological
voting by concern for “the potential reactions of their policy
competitors” including Congress and the President.164
Specifically, many proponents of the strategic model posit that
Justices will modify their preferred position and moderate their
vote in order to avoid an override by Congress,165 and offer their
own empirical studies in support. 166 On its surface, the strategic
model could provide a comprehensive explanation of Title VII’s
varied history that acknowledges the strong, but not sole, role of
ideology, and explains the circumstances under which ideological
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ideological voting. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013);
Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009); West v. Gibson, 527 U.S. 212 (1999); Kolstad
v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526 (1999); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S.
244 (1991); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); Martin v. Wilks, 490
U.S. 755 (1989); Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987); Johnson
v. Trans. Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987); Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters Local 93 v.
Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986); Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S.
561 (1984); Ariz. Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 (1983); Am. Tobacco Co.
v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63 (1982); Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219 (1982); Cnty.
of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981); Cal. Brewers Ass’n v. Bryant, 444
U.S. 598 (1980); Bd. of Trs. of Keene State Coll. v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978); L.A.
Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert,
429 U.S. 125 (1976); Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
163
E.g., EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 9, at 9–10.
164
Bergara et al., supra note 10, at 248.
165
E.g., EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 9, at 13–17, 140–41, 154–57; see also
PACELLE ET AL., supra note 9, at 44–45 (describing the strategic premise that risk of
override constrains the Court); Frank B. Cross & Blake J. Nelson, Strategic
Institutional Effects on Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1437,
1451 (2001) (identifying the risk of override as an element of strategic theory);
Epstein et al., supra note 135, at 595 (noting that, according to strategic theory, the
Supreme Court “will not, in the main, issue decisions that are unacceptable to the
ruling regime”). Some strategic scholars, however, do not rely on the risk of override
theory and data and theorize that risk of override does not need to be effective for
Congress or the President to constrain the Court. See Webber, supra note 119, at
335. What this branch of the strategic model generally fails to identify, however, is
how and when these power-based constraints are operative. Id. at 336.
166
E.g., BAILEY & MALTZMAN, supra note 10, at 15–16; EPSTEIN & KNIGHT,
supra note 9, at 9–13.
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voting is constrained. Ultimately, however, the strategic model
fails as an explanatory paradigm because it does not fully
account for the effect of enacted overrides.
1.

A Strategic Explanation of Title VII’s History

Michael Selmi uses the strategic model of decision making to
explain the pattern of Title VII cases following the Civil Rights
Act of 1991167 (“CRA”). As explained in Part II.C. above, the CRA
amended Title VII to overturn a series of Supreme Court
decisions on Title VII and other discrimination laws.168 Selmi
finds that the CRA had “a meaningful restraining effect on the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence,” and that since its passage, the
Court has generally been “more supportive of plaintiffs’ Title VII
claims than it had been in the years immediately preceding the
CRA.”169 According to Selmi, after the congressional overrides
signaled the elected branches’ willingness to act, the Court
strategically issued decisions more in line with those branches’
preferences.170
In this manner, Selmi connects Title VII
jurisprudence with the strategic model’s premise that the Court’s
ideological decision making is tempered by its concern for the
views and potential response of Congress.171

167
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Selmi, supra note 8, at 282.
Infra Part III.C.3.
169
Selmi, supra note 8, at 282. For example, Selmi found that the Court issued a
higher number of unanimous decisions subsequent to the Civil Rights Act (“CRA”),
the majority of which favored plaintiffs. Id. at 293. These included decisions
prohibiting same-sex harassment, reversing some lower court decisions that had
heightened the plaintiff’s burden and “craft[ing] quite liberal principles of law
relating to retaliation claims.” Id. at 297.
170
Id. at 289–90. One of Selmi’s examples, the post-CRA case Desert Palace v.
Costa, seems particularly illustrative of the strategic move that Selmi identifies. Id.
at 295 (citing Desert Palace v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003)). In this decision—which,
significantly, is authored by conservative Justice Thomas—the Court interpreted
one of the CRA amendments in a manner that expanded plaintiffs’ ability to use a
lower causation standard to prove a case of intentional discrimination. Desert
Palace, 539 U.S. at 101. Throughout the decision, the Court appears significantly
constrained by the amendment. For example, Justice Thomas’s decision relied on his
view of the unambiguous words of the amendment, which “[o]n its face . . . does not
mention, much less require, that a plaintiff make a heightened showing.” Id. at 98–
99.
171
EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 9, at 10, 13 (strategic premise); Bergara et
al., supra note 10, at 248 (strategic premise).
168

37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 240 Side B

04/08/2016 13:04:55

3/24/16 12:16 PM

FINAL_WEBBER.DOCX

868

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89:841

Selmi’s findings are also consistent with at least one other
Supreme Court decision prior to the CRA. In 1976, the Supreme
Court held in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert172 that pregnancybased discrimination was not sex discrimination prohibited by
Title VII.173 The 1978 Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“PDA”)
amended Title VII in direct response to this decision and defined
sex to include “pregnancy, childbirth or related medical
conditions.”174 Six years later, in Newport News Shipbuilding &
Dry Dock v. EEOC,175 the Court embraced the amendment and
issued a decision based on the PDA’s instruction to treat
pregnancy discrimination as a form of sex discrimination.176 In
their seminal work describing the strategic model, Lee Epstein
and Jack Knight cite Newport News as a strong example of
sophisticated, strategic Court behavior where the Justices vote
contrary to their true preferences to avoid congressional
rebuke.177
2.

Limits to the Strategic Model: Lack of Evidence on Enacted
Overrides

Many proponents of the strategic model posit that Justices
will modify their preferred positions and moderate their votes to
avoid an override by Congress.178 As set forth in the author’s
prior work, the strategic model generally has limited relevance
for employment discrimination statutes because the model relies
too heavily on this risk of reversal theory and empirical
evidence.179 The strategic model’s limited focus of its empirical
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429 U.S. 125 (1976).
Id. at 138–40.
174
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012)).
175
462 U.S. 669 (1983).
176
Id. at 684.
177
EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 9, at 15–17.
178
E.g., EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 9, at 13–17, 140–41, 154–57; see also
PACELLE ET AL., supra note 9, at 44–45 (describing the strategic premise that risk of
override constrains the Court); Cross & Nelson, supra note 6, at 1451 (same);
Epstein et al., supra note 134, at 595 (“[According to strategic theory,] the Court will
not, in the main, issue decisions that are unacceptable to the ruling regime.”). Some
strategic scholars, however, do not rely on the risk of override theory and data and
theorize that the risk of override does not need to be effective for Congress or the
President to constrain the Court. See Webber, supra note 119, at 335–36. What this
branch of the strategic model generally fails to identify, however, is how and when
these power-based constraints are operative. Id.
179
Webber, supra note 119, at 328–36.
173
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Id.
Id. at 330–32.
182
See Cross & Nelson, supra note 6, at 1457–58 (“[Examples of overrides]
actually indicate that the Court does not feel constrained by the risk of
reversal. . . . The mere existence of reversals does not disprove the [strategic]
theory . . . but the existence is better evidence against the constraint theory than for
it.”).
183
Webber, supra note 119, at 330, 332–34.
184
Id. at 333–35.
185
Id. at 333.
186
Id. at 333–35.
181

37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 241 Side A

evidence, which mainly consists of studies showing that a risk of
override constrains the Supreme Court, fails to prove strategic
action in circumstances, such as Title VII, where the law is
shaped by enacted overrides.180
To begin with the mere existence of enacted overrides
presents a challenge to strategic theory. If, as the strategic and
integrated models claim, the Court will strategically move its
preferred position in light of the congressional risk of override,
then, conversely, when the override does occur, it is because the
Justices were unconcerned with congressional response. This is
consistent with the attitudinal, not the strategic, model.181 To
claim, as strategists do, that the risk of overrides constrains the
Court, the strategic model must explain why overrides occur,
otherwise it appears the Court simply engaged in attitudinal,
that is ideological, voting and Congress responded.182
The strategists do offer explanations—for example, overrides
may occur because the Court erred in assessing the risk or did
not sufficiently moderate its position to fall within Congress’s
acceptable range of outcomes, or because the makeup of Congress
changed between the time of the Court’s vote and the time of the
overriding legislation.183 These explanations, however, are not
fully supported by empirical evidence.184 If overrides occur
because of errors in calculating the risk of override or the
makeup of Congress changes, then, according to the logic of the
strategic model, once the override has passed this clear rebuke by
the current elected branches, it should move the Court into
conformity.185 A strategic postoverride Court would move its
preferred ideological position on cases in response to the
overriding act; otherwise, the Court votes that are later
overridden are just as equally well explained by ideological
voting, unconcerned with other branches, as by strategic error.186
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The strategic modelists, however, have generally failed to study
whether an override by Congress subsequently reins in the
Court’s ideology-based voting.187
In fact, the few studies of enacted overrides are either
inconclusive or show just the opposite, that the Court does not
move its position in response to enacted overrides, at least in
certain types cases.188 Specifically, in the most relevant example
of override study, Jeb Barnes found that, although overrides
have an effect on judicial decisions in general; that effect was
absent in the context most relevant to Title VII.189 According to
Barnes, where the issues involve protection of minority rights,
legislative overrides do not restrain courts from pursing their
political preferences.190
Thus, the existing evidence more
strongly supports the attitudinal model claim that Justices act
according to ideology without regard for the potential response of
the elected branches. In the absence of empirically based
explanations for why and when overrides occur, the strategic
model does not silence the alternative, ideological explanation.
3.

The Supreme Court’s Resistance to Title VII Overrides

187
188
189
190

192
193

04/08/2016 13:04:55

191

Id. at 332–35.
Id. at 339–43.
BARNES, supra note 6, at 136–37, 171.
Id. at 171.
See supra Part I.C.
E.g., EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 9, at 154–57.
E.g., BAILEY & MALTZMAN, supra note 10, at 15–16.
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This gap or inconsistency in the models’ empirical evidence is
particularly significant to the analysis of Title VII’s
jurisprudence in this Article. Congress has repeatedly amended
Title VII to overturn conservative Supreme Court interpretations
of its provisions.191 If, as strategic modelists claim192—and
integrated modelists claim in part193—the Supreme Court is
constrained by its coequal branches, surely it would alter its Title
VII jurisprudence in the face of such a clear effort by those
branches to assert their position. This expected change of
judicial course, however, has not occurred. As with the strategic
and integrated models’ empirical studies, the history of Title VII,
is more consistent with attitudinal, that is ideological, voting,
with the Supreme Court resisting congressional and executive
efforts to constrain them.
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Selmi, supra note 8, at 281.
Id. at 282.
196
550 U.S. 618, 623–24 (2007).
197
Selmi, supra note 8, at 299–300.
198
Id. (citing Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 and 42 U.S.C.)).
199
Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 661.
200
E.g., Epstein et al., supra note 134, at 592–95.
201
Selmi, supra note 8, at 298; Cross & Nelson, supra note 6, at 1457. As Cross
and Nelson explain, the decisions limiting the scope of Title VII after the CRA
“demonstrate that the courts do not seem to respond to the risk of an override.” Id.
at 1457. “Congress made quite clear in . . . the Civil Rights Act of 1991 that it
wanted a more liberal interpretation of civil rights statutes and was prepared to
legislate to this effect. Yet the Court continued its pattern of conservative
interpretation of those statutes despite their amendment.” Id.
195
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As explained above, Selmi makes the opposite claim,
asserting that after the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (“CRA”), which
amended Title VII in order to overturn a number of conservative
Supreme Court cases, the Court shifted its position and issued
more liberal decisions.194 At the same time, Selmi also found a
significant number of post-CRA cases where the Justices
continued to follow their political preferences.195 For example,
Selmi cites Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,196 a postCRA decision in which the Court made it substantially more
difficult for plaintiffs to bring unequal pay claims.197
Significantly, just two years after the decision, Congress passed
and President Obama signed the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of
2009, which amended Title VII in order to overturn this
decision.198
The Ledbetter case poses a challenge to the strategic and
integrated theories, specifically to the modelists who posit that
the Supreme Court moves its position to avoid congressional
override. The Supreme Court must have been aware of the risk
that its Ledbetter decision could be overridden; Justice Ginsburg
directly called for such an override in her dissent.199 Given this
clear risk of override, according to strategic models, the
conservative members of the Court should have moderated their
position to avoid congressional response;200 however, they failed
to do so. In fact, as Selmi explains, Ledbetter is just one of a
number of post-CRA decisions in which the Court’s conservative
members did not moderate their preferences despite the Act and
its strong signal that the elected branches intended a broader
interpretation of Title VII.201 Moreover, subsequent to the
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publication of Selmi’s analysis, the Supreme Court issued two
additional decisions in Title VII which substantially limit Title
VII’s reach.202 All of these postoverride ideology-based decisions
would seem to undermine any claim that the strategic or
integrated model can explain Title VII’s jurisprudence.
Although he
Selmi, however, maintains this claim.203
describes a mix of post-CRA Supreme Court decisions, some
apparently constrained by the Act and some apparently not,
Selmi describes the overall behavior of the Court as strategic.204
According to Selmi, the Court moved its position in a strategic
response to the CRA, except in the “most ideological”205 or
“controversial and important”206 cases. He concludes that the
CRA changed the Court207 in those cases that did not implicate
its clear preferences,208 but that in cases that mattered most209 to
the Court, the Justices followed their respective political
preferences.210 Selmi’s explanation has appeal. It is indeed
strategic for Justices to issue opinions that risk congressional
rebuke only in cases that are most significant.
This is not, however, the precise meaning of strategic
behavior according to political theory. In Selmi’s explanation,
the trigger for strategic movement is salience.211 The Supreme
Court will move its position in response to other branch
preferences so long as the issue is not too important to the
Justice’s particular ideology.212 According to strategic political
theory, however, the trigger for strategic position movement is
not salience, but rather, risk of override, or other congressional
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202
See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2533 (2013)
(holding that a heightened causation standard applies to Title VII retaliation
claims); Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2439 (2013) (limiting employer
liability for sexual harassment by narrowly defining supervisor).
203
Selmi, supra note 8, at 301–02.
204
Id.
205
Id. at 282.
206
Id. at 292, 298 (“In the most significant cases . . . defendants continue to
prevail, and often by five to four majorities. In these cases, the Court continues to
impose its preferences, but now does so while also issuing a series of pro-plaintiff
decisions, most of which likely do not implicate clear preferences of the Court.”).
207
Id. at 301 (“[T]he cases decided after 1991 reveal a decidedly different
Supreme Court from the one that prompted passage of the CRA.”).
208
Id. at 298.
209
Id. at 291.
210
Id. at 291–92, 298, 300–01.
211
Id. at 298.
212
Id. at 290–91.
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rebuke.213 That is, the Court will move its position if it has
reliable information that the current Congress would override or
potentially use its other powers—such as budget—in response to
a decision.214
Indeed, Congress is more likely to override a Court decision
when it concerns controversial and important matters.215
Overrides require effort and time only a motivated elected body
will invest;216 logically, Congress is less likely to do so for less
significant issues. Selmi asserts that the Title VII pattern is to
act according to preference even in the matters most likely to
draw congressional attention.217 This is the opposite premise of
strategic political theory.218 The refusal to move position in cases
of ideological importance is actually more, or at least equally,
consistent with the attitudinal model which claims that Justices
decide cases according to political preference regardless of the
views of its coequal branches.219 In fact, a study by political
science scholars Isaac Unah and Ange-Marie Hancock found that
salience is a trigger for attitudinal, not strategic, voting by
Justices.220 Their empirical study finds that the more salient the
issue is to the Court, the more likely the Court is to engage in
ideology-based voting, rather than strategic behavior.221
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213
E.g., EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 9, at 12–15, 138–39, 154–57; Bergara et
al., supra note 10, at 247–51; Cross & Nelson, supra note 166, at 1450, 1452, 1445–
46, 1459–60; Epstein et al., supra note 134, at 592–94; Jeffrey A. Segal et al.,
Congress, the Supreme Court, and Judicial Review: Testing a Constitutional
Separation of Powers Model, 55 AM. J. POL. SCI. 89, 90 (2011); see also BAILEY &
MALTZMAN, supra note 10, at 13–14 (describing strategic theory); EPSTEIN ET AL,
supra note 126, at 85–86 (describing strategic theory); PACELLE ET AL., supra note 9,
at 39–40, 42–45 (same).
214
E.g., EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 9, at 13–17, 140–41, 154–57; see also
PACELLE ET AL., supra note 9, at 44–45 (describing the strategic premise that risk of
override constrains the Court); Cross & Nelson, supra note 6, at 1451 (identifying
the role of risk of override in strategic theory); Epstein et al., supra note 134, at 595
(“[According to strategic theory,] the Court will not, in the main, issue decisions that
are unacceptable to the ruling regime.”). The empirical basis for strategic theory
matches its theoretical premise and demonstrates Court movement due to concern
for risk of override or other congressional rebuke. See, e.g., Bergara et al., supra note
10; Segal et al., supra note 213.
215
See BAILEY & MALTZMAN, supra note 10, at 117.
216
See, e.g., Cross & Nelson, supra note 6, at 1452–53.
217
Selmi, supra note 8, at 292.
218
See supra note 201.
219
See supra Part III.B.
220
Unah & Hancock, supra note 154, at 209–13.
221
Id. Bailey and Maltzman found the opposite: that strategic considerations
were more likely to constrain the Court on salient issues. BAILEY & MALTZMAN,
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Moreover, two political science analyses of the CRA came to the
opposite conclusion of Selmi; both Jeb Barnes, and Frank Cross
and Blake Nelson, respectively, found that the CRA did not
constrain the Court from its ideological voting.222
Thus, the post-CRA history of Title VII is more indicative of
an ideological, attitudinal Court rather than a strategic Court.
As the CRA example demonstrates, the strategic model is not the
most compelling explanation of Title VII’s history and,
particularly given the Court’s resistance to Title VII overrides,
the attitudinal explanation is more accurate.
D. Title VII and the Integrated Model
As explained in Part III.A., the integrated model of judicial
decision making, like the strategic model, finds that Justices’
political preferences influence decisions but are constrained by
strategic concerns.223 Although the integrated modelists improve
the empirical basis for the role of strategic factors,224 their studies
are also premised on risk of override acting as the restraining
force.225 For the reasons explained above, this limits the utility of
this theory in the Title VII context where that risk has been
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supra note 10, at 117–20. However, this conclusion still contradicts Selmi’s finding
that in the most salient post-CRA cases, the Court was less constrained. As noted
above, Selmi’s finding is more consistent with attitudinal voting.
222
In his seminal study of overrides, Jeb Barnes describes the CRA as a failed
override, explaining that the Supreme Court still followed its own preferences after
its passage. BARNES, supra note 6, at 13–15 (noting, for example, that following the
CRA, the Supreme Court still felt free to create its own employer-friendly standard
for punitive damages, contrary to the language of the statute). Frank B. Cross and
Blake Nelson similarly describe the Supreme Court’s response to the CRA as
ideological with the conservative Court ignoring Congress’s clear message that it
intended a broader interpretation of Title VII. Cross & Nelson, supra note 6, at
1456–57. Indeed, Cross and Nelson describe the Court’s response to the CRA as a
“model case study in the shortcomings of the legislative override.” Id. at 1456; see
also Widiss, supra note 42, at 538–45 (explaining how the Supreme Court’s reliance
on “shadow precedents” undermined the efficacy of the Civil Rights Act of 1991).
223
BAILEY & MALTZMAN, supra note 10, at 15–16; PACELLE ET AL., supra note 9,
at 53.
224
BAILEY & MALTZMAN, supra note 10, at 101–20 (describing the lack of
consensus in empirical strategic studies, the challenges for empirical studies in this
area, and presenting methods to address those challenges); PACELLE ET AL., supra
note 9, at 45–47, 51–62 (describing critiques of prior legal and strategic model
empirical studies and presenting the research design of an approach to address
these critiques).
225
BAILEY & MALTZMAN, supra note 10, at 103–08; PACELLE ET AL., supra note
9, at 54–61.
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226
BAILEY & MALTZMAN, supra note 11, at 121–39; PACELLE ET AL., supra note
9, at 51–62.
227
PACELLE ET AL., supra note 9, at 68.
228
487 U.S. 977 (1988).
229
Id. at 990.
230
Id. at 981, 990.
231
401 U.S. 424 (1971).
232
Watson, 487 U.S. at 989–91.
233
Id. at 989.
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routinely ignored by the Court. The integrated model, however,
further finds that Justices’ political preferences are also
constrained by legal factors, and, specifically, this model offers
empirical studies that demonstrate the restraining effect of
precedent.226 The role of precedent could therefore provide an
alternative explanation for the Title VII cases where the Justices
appear to vote contrary to ideology.227
For example, in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust,228 the
Court expanded Title VII in a liberal direction, holding that the
disparate impact theory was not limited to objective practices
such as screening tests and that subjective employment practices
could be challenged for causing a disparate impact based on
gender, race, or other protected category.229 The decision was
unanimous as to this holding with conservative Justices Scalia
and Rehnquist joining moderate Justices O’Connor, White, and
Kennedy—along with liberal Justices Stevens, Marshall,
Blackmun, and Brennan—in voting for this liberal outcome.230
The Supreme Court first created the disparate impact doctrine in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,231 and its long history of cases
developing that theory played a major role in the Watson
decision.232 As Justice O’Connor explained in the opinion of the
Court, “[O]ur decisions in Griggs and succeeding cases could
largely be nullified if disparate impact analysis were applied only
to standardized selection practices.”233
Thus, in Watson,
precedent appeared to restrain the conservative—and potentially
the moderate—Justices’ political preferences, resulting in a
unanimous liberal outcome.
Overall, the integrated model’s theory and evidence
regarding precedent offers a useful explanation for some of the
Title VII cases where ideological voting did not occur. In a
number of cases where the Justices voted contrary to political
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preference, the Justices relied heavily on precedent.234 That said,
Congress has repeatedly overruled Supreme Court precedent on

04/08/2016 13:04:55
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234
E.g., Lorace v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 913 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (“Although I remain convinced that the Court misconstrued Title VII
in American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, and in Delaware State College v. Ricks, the
Court has correctly applied those decisions to the case at hand. And it is the Court's
construction of the statute—rather than the views of an individual Justice—that
becomes a part of the law.” (citations omitted) (joining in a conservative outcome));
see also Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless LP, 562 U.S. 170, 173–74 (2011) (resulting in
a unanimous liberal outcome based on Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co.
v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006), precedent); AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 556 U.S. 701, 710–
11 (2009) (resulting in a conservative outcome for which liberal Justices Souter and
Stevens joined, based on precedential impact of General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429
U.S. 125 (1976)); Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270–71 (2001)
(resulting in a unanimous conservative decision based on clear precedent concerning
severe or pervasive); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78–79
(1998) (resulting in a unanimous liberal outcome relying on series of major
precedents on harassment and reverse discrimination); Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510
U.S. 17, 21–22 (1993) (resulting in a unanimous liberal outcome based on Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), precedent); Postal Serv. Bd. of
Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714–17 (1983) (resulting in unanimous decision
with both conservative and liberal outcomes based in large part on McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), precedent); Zipes v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 399–400 (1982) (resulting in a unanimous holding that
retroactive seniority was appropriate remedy in light of precedent case Franks v.
Bowman Trans. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976)); Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 252–56 (1981) (unanimous conservative outcome based on McDonnell
Douglas and other precedent); Furnco Const. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 575–80
(1978) (resulting in a unanimous conservative decision relying on McDonnell
Douglas and other precedent); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299,
308 (1977) (using reasoning based on International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), precedent and resulting in a conservative
decision in which liberal Justices Brennan, Blackmun, Stewart, and Marshall
joined); Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 139–43 (1977) (relying on Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), and Gilbert to determine whether employer
policies regarding pregnancy leave were violations of Title VII and resulting in a
unanimous liberal decision). The effect of precedent was not universal, however. See,
e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 763–64, 766 (1998) (using
binding precedent in Meritor and resulting in conservative Justice Rehnquist
joining Justices Breyer, Souter, and Stevens in liberal decision, with Justices Scalia
and Thomas dissenting); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) (using
binding precedent in Meritor and resulting in conservative Justice Rehnquist joining
Justices Breyer, Souter, and Stevens in a liberal decision, with Justices Scalia and
Thomas dissenting); see also Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 141–44 (2004)
(using analogous labor law precedent, consistent court of appeals outcomes, and
analogous Title VII precedent, conservative Justices joined in a liberal outcome with
conservative Justice Thomas dissenting); Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536
U.S. 101, 110–11, 116, 123 (2002) (relying on statutory language and precedent,
conservative Justice Thomas authored a liberal opinion joined by Justices Souter,
Stevens, and Ginsburg, conservative Justices Rehnquist and Scalia dissenting).
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Title VII.235 As a result, the influence of the legal factor of
precedent in Title VII jurisprudence is interrupted by, and
stands in conflict with, the legal factor of statutory language.236
Thus, precedent’s constraining force may provide an explanation
of the Title VII cases where Justices voted contrary to ideology,
but only a limited one.237 The open and perhaps more pressing
question for Title VII analysis is what effect the law—in the form
of statutory overriding language—has on the Supreme Court.
The integrated model studies do not fully answer this question.
The effect of overriding statutes on the Supreme Court is
particularly relevant as such statutes embody both strategic
factors, that is the elected branches’ viewpoint, and legal factors,
such as a binding rule of law for a particular subject. As set forth
above, the Title VII overrides were not effective in generally
235

See supra Part I.C.
In fact, Deborah Widiss has found that the persistent influence of precedent
undermines the effectiveness of the various amendments to Title VII. Widiss, supra
note 42. Widiss, for example, describes the courts’ practice of using “shadow
precedents”—that is, continuing to follow overridden precedent despite explicit
congressional amendments to Title VII which overturned those decisions. Id. at 536–
56.
237
See Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Influence of Stare Decisis on the
Votes of United States Supreme Court Justices, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 971, 983 (1996)
(“90.8% of the [Supreme Court] votes conform to the [J]ustices’ revealed preferences.
That is, only 9.2% of the time did a [J]ustice switch to the position established in the
landmark precedent.”). The decision in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.
provides a compelling example of the limits of precedent as an explanatory factor
and the need to better understand the role of overriding statutory language. 557
U.S. 167, 174 (2009). In Gross, the Supreme Court refused to extend one of the
CRA’s overriding amendments to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(“ADEA”). Id. at 174–75. The ADEA is a separate statute from Title VII, but it has
many similarities in language. The CRA amended Title VII to create a lower
causation standard, “mixed motive,” that made it easier to for plaintiffs to prove
discrimination. Id. at 173–74. However, Congress did not amend the ADEA in this
manner. Id. Prior to Gross, courts generally interpreted the ADEA according to the
same law and standards as Title VII. Id. at 183. In Gross, the Supreme Court held
that because Congress only amended Title VII in the CRA, the CRA’s broad
language allowing for “mixed motive causation” could not apply to the ADEA. Id. at
174–75. The Court went even further to reject its own prior precedent that had
judicially created a less stringent mixed motive standard, leaving ADEA plaintiffs
with the much more difficult task of proving but-for causation. Id. at 178–79. Thus,
the decision was strongly shaped by the Court’s view of statutory language and
history, not by precedent. See Selmi, supra note 8, at 299 (suggesting that the
different results under Title VII and the ADEA may be a sign of the importance of
statutory language). The limits of congressional override left the Court free to vote
according to political preference and ignore precedent in the process. See Debra A.
Widiss, Undermining Congressional Overrides: The Hydra Problem in Statutory
Interpretation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 859 (2012).
236
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constraining the Supreme Court’s ideological voting patterns.
However, in the narrow circumstance where the statute’s
language provided on-point guidance, the Supreme Court did
seem to take notice.238 Thus, in a number of Title VII cases
where the Justices voted contrary to ideology, they appeared to
do so in light of on-point statutory language.239 This is consistent
with Barnes’s study, which found that the more directly an
overriding statute addressed an issue, the more likely the
override was to influence subsequent Court decisions.240 Indeed,
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238
For this restraint to work, however, the statute must be clear and
substantive on the issue at hand. As the author has explained in prior work, if the
statute is not sufficiently substantive and leaves room for interpretation, that room
will allow for ideological voting. See generally Webber, supra note 119.
239
E.g., White, 548 U.S. 53, 61–62 (2006) (using statutory differences between
Title VII’s antidiscrimination and retaliation provisions to reach a unanimous
liberal outcome); Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003) (discussed supra in
Part III.D.); see also Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 555 U.S. 271, 278–79
(2009) (reaching a unanimous outcome by reasoning that to rule otherwise would
undermine Faragher-Ellerth precedent); UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S.
187, 211–24 (1991) (concurring in the outcome, conservative Justices Rehnquist and
Scalia concur based on § 703(h) of Title VII and Pregnancy Discrimination Act
amendment to Title VII’s language); Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60,
68–69 (1986) (relying on statutory language regarding religious accommodation,
liberal Justices Brennan and Blackmun joined the conservative outcome); Hishon v.
King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73–77 (1984) (reaching a liberal outcome joined by
Justices Rehnquist, Burger, White, and Powell); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S.
321, 334 (1977) (finding that the BFOQ defense should be narrowly defined, based
on “the restrictive language of § 703(e)” of Title VII along with legislative history
and EEOC guidance and reaching a liberal outcome in which conservative Justices
Burger and Rehnquist joined); Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 348–53 (exempting seniority
systems from Title VII liability based on language of § 703(h) of Title VII in a
decision where liberal Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and Stevens joined in a
conservative result that); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 73–75,
79–83 (1977) (using the language of §§ 703(h) and 703(j) of Title VII to reach a
conservative outcome joined by Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and Stevens);
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 278–80 (1976) (holding
unanimously among liberal, conservative and moderate Justices that Title VII
applied to white employees as well as black employees) (“Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 prohibits the discharge of ‘any individual’ because of ‘such individual's
race[.]’ Its terms are not limited to discrimination against members of any particular
race.” (citations omitted)); cf. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 257–64
(1994) (concluding that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 had no clear statutory directive
on retroactivity, the liberal Justices Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens joined the
conservative outcome); Meritor, 477 U.S. at 63–67 (recognizing sexual harassment as
a form of sex discrimination by relying on statutory language, EEOC Guidelines,
and uniformity of holdings among circuit courts resulting in a unanimous liberal
outcome).
240
BARNES, supra note 6, at 80, 90–91 (stating that prescriptive overriding
statutes “on their face, attempt to resolve the override issue” and have more
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even given the ideological behavior of the Court, it is unlikely
that the Court would reject explicit statutory directives as doing
so—in the absence of a constitutional basis—would be an affront
to the basic power of the legislature.
Statutes, however, frequently leave room for interpretation
or other open questions that provide the space for ideological
decisions to enter.
Moreover, straightforward statutory
questions are far less likely to be resolved by the Supreme
Court.241 As a result, the Supreme Court may be slightly
constrained in its ideological voting by the force of law in the
form of statutory language, but this constraint is limited.
Overall, legal factors in the form of precedent and direct
statutory language offer some, albeit limited, explanatory utility
for Title VII, and, to this extent only, the integrated model is
effective.
IV. RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS

C M
Y K

04/08/2016 13:04:55

influence on the courts than partial overrides that delegate significant aspects of the
law to the courts).
241
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial Behavior: A
Statistical Study, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 775, 789 (2009) (“That a Justice’s ideology
plays a significant role in his or her votes . . . is not surprising; since the lower courts
will have decided the straightforward cases—cases that can be decided on the basis
of the orthodox materials of legal decision-making, such as statutory or
constitutional text and precedent, the cases that the Supreme Court decides will
tend to involve disputes that cannot be resolved legalistically.”).
242
See supra Part III.A.
243
See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 9, at 9–10.
244
BARNES, supra note 6, at 171.
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The political science models of judicial decision making
provide an empirical basis for concluding that Supreme Court
Justices’ political viewpoints have and continue to shape Title
VII case law. The studies by proponents of the attitudinal,
strategic and integrated models all demonstrate that the
Justices’ ideology plays a role in Supreme Court’s decisions.242
These results are consistent with the dozens of Title VII cases
where the Court split along ideological lines.243 Moreover,
Barnes’s study shows that Title VII’s main subject, the protection
of the rights of minorities, is an area where judicial ideology is
particularly strong and particularly resistant to constraint.244
Indeed, even in the face of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, a
sweeping congressional override of over ten conservative
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245

See supra Part III.C.
S. Res. 15, 113th Cong. (2013) (enacted); see also S. Res. 16, 113th Cong.
(2013) (enacted).
247
See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, H.R. 1755, 113th Cong.
(2013).
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Supreme Court decisions, and the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of
2009, which promptly overturned yet another restrictive Title VII
decision, conservative Justices continue to vote to limit Title VII’s
reach.245 Overall, the models provide a compelling case that Title
VII’s jurisprudence reflects ideology-based decision making by
the Supreme Court.
Less successful are efforts to use the political science models
of judicial decision making to explain the exceptions to
ideological voting in Title VII. The strategic and integrated
models offer theories on how and when Justices from a
predominantly ideological Supreme Court can be constrained to
vote contrary to their preference. However, given these models’
failure to study enacted overriding statutes, the strategic and
integrated theories do not provide an effective explanatory
paradigm for Title VII. Instead, in this highly political area of
law, only a smaller category of constraints—cases that are less
salient, or governed by strong precedent or clear statutory
language—appeared to have had any effect on the Court’s
otherwise ideological voting.
This result has important implications for advocates seeking
to shape the laws of employment equity. As just one recent
example, the established role of viewpoint in decision making
may justify limits on the ability to use filibuster to block judicial
appointments.246 Moreover, those seeking to add important new
protected classes247 should consider whether the proposed law
leaves room for ideological Supreme Court decisions that will
undermine its effect. Further, if the Supreme Court will shape
Title VII according to ideology more than law, perhaps the time
and effort of yet another override is better spent on the
presidential elections. Alternatively, this result may add a
compelling reason to shift employment equity advocacy away
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from individual rights litigation to benefit-based laws248 or other
nontraditional approaches249 that may be less susceptible to
judicial interference.
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248
See, e.g., Our Issues, BETTER BALANCE, http://www.abetterbalance.org/web/
ourissues (last visited Apr. 10, 2015).
249
E.g., Kirsten K. Davis, Extending the Vision: An Empowerment Identity
Approach to Work-Family Regulation as Applied to School Involvement Leave
Statutes, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 613, 658 (2010).

